**Untapped potential of collective intelligence in conservation and environmental decision making**

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**Abstract**

Environmental decisions are often deferred to groups of experts, committees, or panels to develop climate policy, plan protected areas, or negotiate trade-offs for biodiversity conservation. There is, however, surprisingly little empirical research on the performance of group decision making related to the environment. We examined examples from a range of different disciplines, demonstrating the emergence of collective intelligence in the elicitation of quantitative estimates, crowdsourcing applications, and small-group problem solving. I explored the to which similar tools are used in environmental decision making. This revealed important gaps (e.g. a lack of integration of fundamental research in decision making practice, the absence of systematic evaluation frameworks) that obstruct mainstreaming of collective intelligence. By making judicious use of interdisciplinary learning opportunities, collective intelligence can be harnessed effectively to improve decision making in conservation and environmental management. To elicit reliable quantitative estimates we require an understanding of cognitive psychology; to optimise crowdsourcing we may need to incorporate AI tools; and the business literature offers insights into the importance of soft skills and diversity in team effectiveness. Environmental problems set a challenging and rich testing ground for collective intelligence tools and frameworks; we argue this creates an opportunity for significant advancement in decision making research and practice.

**Introduction**

Judgment and decision making are integral to conservation and environmental management, but the processes are complex and error-prone, in part due to the inherent uncertainty of social-ecological systems (Schick et al. 2017) and because decision makers have cognitive limitations. Under certain conditions, groups can deliver more accurate factual estimates and creative solutions to problems, referred to as collective intelligence (CI) (Malone & Bernstein, 2015). Democratic elections, jury decisions, and recruitment selection panels are founded on the idea that collectives have access to greater problem-solving resources (Landemore 2012), especially if processes for eliciting and aggregating information, beliefs, and preferences are effective (Hastie & Kameda 2005). Disciplines, including organizational psychology and economics, have long studied group dynamics, but scientific interest in CI has flourished only recently. Enhanced group judgements are reported in medical diagnostics (Mayo & Woolley 2016), taxonomic classification (Prestopnik & Crowston 2012), and meteorological forecasts (Hueffer et al. 2013). There has been little recognition of the opportunities for collective intelligence in conservation or environmental management.

*Collective intelligence* applies to “groups of individuals acting together in ways that seem intelligent” (Malone & Bernstein 2015) and covers a range of practices and tools. In this essay, we evaluate its potential to enhance conservation and environmental decision making. We highlight the strengths and weaknesses of three specific applications (Figure 1), and aim to set a research agenda. We examined wisdom-of-the-crowd effects (specifically how quantitative estimates are improved through structured elicitation) and investigated how crowdsourcing is used to gather distributed and diverse inputs to solve complex problems. We also considered CI as an emergent property in teams making collaborative decisions and reviewed the conditions under which this may occur. If judiciously applied, CI could be deployed more effectively in decision making about environmental problems.

**Improving quantitative judgements**

Decision makers often have inadequate information, but accurate estimates can be achieved by aggregating individual judgements, most straightforwardly by simple averaging (Armstrong 2001). Wise crowd judgement relies on a large set of diverse and independent opinions in which random errors cancel out to reveal underlying information (Galton, 1907; Surowiecki 2005).

Yet many real-world decision-making contexts are messy, and the simple rules of crowd wisdom may not apply. People use shared resources to inform their opinions, making use of multiple cues that are often spatially and temporally correlated and vary in reliability. Large groups are subject to biasing effects of correlated information (Kao & Couzin 2014). Decision making may also go awry when social interactions among participants, such as dominance, trigger individuals to revise their judgments, ultimately leading to convergence without accuracy improvement (Lorenz et al. 2011). The impact is more notable in centralized social networks (Becker et al. 2017). Aggregated judgment accuracy improves when individual estimates are negatively correlated, suggesting that divergent opinions enhance collective judgment (Davis-Stober et al. 2014).

Individual contributions may be weighted based on criteria, such as stated confidence or level of expertise (e.g. Prelec et al. 2017). Unfortunately, there is little relationship between people’s confidence and their accuracy (Burgman et al. 2011). Those considered experts by others typically provide confidence bounds that are too narrow (Soll & Klayman 2004), leading to poor judgement on all but the simplest questions (Griffin & Tversky 1992). The best predictor of accuracy is prior performance on questions of a similar kind, irrespective of experience, qualification, or training (McBride et al. 2012). Implementing such testing procedures is not always feasible due to resource or time constraints or the difficulty of obtaining and validating test questions.

While aggregation can minimize random error, systematic bias may arise from entrenched, value-based positions or anchoring on previous judgements (e.g., Bosetti et al. 2017). Such cognitive biases are pervasive and occur most often when people use mental shortcuts (heuristics) rather than engaging in in-depth processing (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). When applied ineffectively, heuristics distort judgements; this affects group judgements too because standard aggregation techniques do not correct bias (e.g., Simmons et al. 2011).

Success of mitigation approaches vary (Montibeller & von Winterfeldt 2015). Education in logic and probability theory sometimes enhances judgments (Larrick 2004). Even a single training session based on innovative “serious games” persistently reduces judgement bias (Morewedge et al. 2015). However, motivational incentives have little effect (Camerer & Hogarth 1999). Changing the problem presentation can generate more accurate judgements, e.g. by restating probabilistic questions as natural-frequency problems (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995). Overprecision can be reduced by asking for bounds before eliciting a best estimate and requiring respondents to estimate how confident they are (Speirs-Bridge et al. 2009). Deliberate practice and unambiguous and immediate feedback are also helpful (Fischhoff 1982). Socially mediated biases, such as group-think and dominance effects, can be managed through well-structured interaction (e.g. Schultze et al. 2012), and feedback about others’ estimates improves individual judgments (Wintle et al. 2012).

Structured elicitation methods have been developed that offer multiple strategies to reduce bias and improve accuracy. In conventional Delphi protocols, experts interact through a facilitator who provides feedback about others’ estimates. The aim is to reach consensus rapidly (Rowe & Wright 2001), but accuracy is not guaranteed (Murphy et al. 1998). Improving on this, the IDEA protocol uses guided social interactions to avoid the biasing elements of group deliberation and behavioral aggregation (Hanea et al. 2017). Participants provide individual estimates before receiving anonymized information about peer judgments. Ensuing group discussion introduces new information and reconciles differences in understanding. In a second round, individual, anonymous estimates are averaged. The method generates relatively accurate judgements that usually improve with performance-based weighting (Hanea et al. 2018).

Appropriately managed, aggregate estimates from many contributors (experts or not) typically surpass those of conventionally knowledgeable individuals. Most real-life problem settings, although complex and multifaceted, require some element of judgement and are informed by factual estimates. This suggests great potential in harnessing this form of CI to provide more accurate and reliable decision making.

**Distributed processing**

Complex problem solving requires more than collating and estimating facts; it assumes active coordination of cognitive resources and mental activity. Even cognitively simple animals (e.g., ants) act collectively to undertake complex tasks and solve problems that are intractable for individuals (Krause et al. 2010). Social learning (i.e., learning from observation of others’ behavior) probably plays an important role in this phenomenon in animal collectives (Kao et al. 2014) as well as some human decision-making groups (e.g. Kurvers et al. 2014). In “swarm intelligence,” a population of unintelligent or uninformed agents, each following simple rules, interacting locally, may produce intelligent global behaviour without the need for centralised control.

This principle has been used to amplify the intelligence of human groups by connecting networked individuals through an online interface that is moderated by artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms (Rosenberg 2016). Artificial swarm intelligence (ASI) enables groups of people to answer questions, make predictions, express opinions, and reach decisions as a unified emergent intelligence by tracking group members as they signal their intent toward choice alternatives. The group’s decision is dynamic, representing real-time negotiation among group members collectively exploring the decision space and converging upon the most agreeable answer. Artificial swarm intelligence outperforms medical experts and machine-learning algorithms, makes relatively accurate predictions for financial markets and the outcomes of sport events (Rosenberg et al. 2017, 2018).

Despite the success of AI-supported systems, the dominant form of crowdsourcing still relies on some central control. Originally, crowdsourcing enabled tasks once performed by a single expert or a small group to be executed through a wide, undefined network of individuals, connected via the web (Howe 2006). A vast range of applications, from simple, repetitive tasks to multifactorial problem solving and design innovation have since been explored. Typical crowdsourcing marketplaces (e.g., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk [AMT]) connect requesters with thousands of potential workers to complete so-called human intelligence tasks rapidly and in parallel. The Lego Company, for instance, launched a public call to design new products, rewarding successful creators with a 1% royalty on net revenue. Many applications (e.g., Google Earth) rely on intrinsic public-good motivation to mobilise distributed knowledge. Its success extends to scientific advancement (e.g., a new protein structure discovered through an online game; Cooper et al. 2010).

Although most crowdsourcing is collaborative, distributed knowledge can also be aggregated efficiently in competitive settings. In prediction markets,participants trade the probabilities of the outcomes of events, receiving pay outs when events occur. The market price reflects a consensus forecast of the underlying event probability, which is typically more accurate than probabilities gathered through conventional polls and surveys (Paton et al. 2009). Prediction markets effectively forecast, for example, election results (Rothschild 2009), company valuations (Berg et al. 2009), and spread of infectious disease (Polgreen et al. 2007).

Despite its uptake in commercial and public sectors, we have only a rudimentary understanding of the intellectual gains crowdsourcing may achieve and under which conditions this happens (Zhao & Zhu 2014). Some evidence does suggest that a traditional micro-tasking approach has potential for significant intelligence amplification. Kosinski et al (2012) crowdsourced the completion of a non-verbal intelligence test by AMT workers and aggregated responses by majority vote. They found that collective intelligence increased with the size of the crowd, although with marginal gains were achieved in groups with more than 6 members, a finding replicated by our own group (Vercammen et al. 2019).

Yet, crowdsourcing platforms do not automatically enhance collective intelligence (Guth & Brabham 2017). Crowdsourcing can produce problematic or ineffectual solutions (Greengard 2011) and may not be egalitarian (Brabham 2012) or produce unbalanced views that do not reflect the majority’s voice (e.g., Wikipedia entries [Lee and Seo 2016]). Because contributors’ efforts cannot be observed directly, and individual accuracy is difficult to monitor due to volume of data, potential free-riding, malicious, or manipulative activities need to be curtailed, e.g. through motivational tools such as reputation metrics (Allahbakhsh et al. 2013). Crowdsourcing complex or creative products may require active promotion of collective learning and tailored feedback (e.g. Cullina et al. 2015). For instance, output quality on a creative task improves when workers are informed of other contributors’ efforts and their rationales (Xiao 2014).

To maximise the utility of crowdsourcing as a support tool further research is required, focusing on the management of contributors’ behaviour, quality-control measures, incentive schemes, and systematic evaluation of crowdsourcing performance.

**Small-group collaboration**

The small, collaborative consensus-seeking group is the most popular forum for decision making. Groups often outperform the average and the best-regarded individual within a group (Hill 1982). However, “group think” may compromise decisions by introducing dominance effects and correlated judgements. Cases such as the Bay of Pigs invastion (Janis, 1982) highlight that perceived expertise, social status, cognitive and motivational biases, differences in personality and thinking styles, and social processes all potentially influence a group’s ability to act intelligently. So, can one measure and predict a group’s collective intelligence? The psychometric concept of intelligence is based on the finding that a single underlying dimension, *g*,(general intelligence), explains 40-50% of individual variability in test performance across a range of cognitive domains (e.g., numeracy, working memory, visuospatial skills). General intelligence can be measured reliably, varies among individuals, but is relatively constant over time within an individual (Spearman 1904). It also correlates well with scholastic achievement, job performance, and other indicators of success, consistent with the concept of intelligence as an “adaptive capacity” (Nisbett et al. 2012).

To examine whether a group equivalent of the individual *g* exists, Woolley et al (2010) assessed small, randomly assembled groups on tasks relevant to group performance (e.g., creative thinking, decision making, rational judgments under uncertainty ). A single underlying dimension explained 43% of group-performance variability, which the authors took as evidence of a collective intelligence factor (*c*). When the same groups were challenged on a strategy game or an architectural design challenge, *c* predicted group achievement, whereas individual intelligence did not, suggesting the problem-solving capacity of groups does not depend directly on intellectual ability of individual group members.

Group performance appears to depend more on soft skills than individual cognitive acumen. The single best predictor of collective intelligence is average social perceptiveness, or group members’ ability to correctly identify and appropriately respond to ones’ own mental states and those of others, a skill linked to empathy (Woolley et al. 2010). Even a few group members with low social perception can adversely affect collective intelligence (Engel et al. 2014).

Diversity of identity (e.g., demographic differences) and disposition (differences in problem-solving approaches and heuristics) drive CI in small groups (Hong & Page 2004). An intermediate level of diversity in thinking styles appears to be particularly advantageous (Aggarwal et al. 2015). Too much diversity within groups hampers communication through lack of trust and respect (Jackson et al. 2003). Within-group communication patterns are also relevant; high-performing online collaborations typically exhibit high volumes of interaction and more equal conversational turn-taking (Engel et al. 2014; Aggarwal et al. 2015). Groups that synchronise their activities to allow for more immediate feedback also tend to outperform those that do not use these strategies (Kim et al. 2017).

Some qualitative aspects of group communication also improve group CI. To solve difficult problems, groups must develop a shared mental model (e.g. Maciejovsky et al. 2013), and the more diverse the shared information, the better the group does (Riedl & Woolley 2016). This emerges in so-called hidden profile tasks, where some relevant information is known to most group members, whereas other facts are available only to individuals. A bias toward discussing shared information and avoiding unique or private information contributes to pooling distributed facts (Stasser & Titus 1985), which may have important consequences (Lu et al. 2012). This suggests sharing of rare information should be incentivised so that collaborative groups benefit from all available knowledge (Tausczik & Boons 2018).

Although some argue that coordination cost associated with group problem solving may nullify the potential intellectual gain (Bates & Gupta 2017), well-managed teams have substantial CI. To enable reliable engineering of CI-supportive conditions, more systematic research is required into effects of compositional features (e.g., individual cognitive ability, empathic skill) and operational characteristics (e.g., opportunity for participation, group communication patterns) in teams working on real-world problems.

**Collective intelligence in conservation**

Expert judgements are indispensable when data are scarce and decisions about socioecological systems are complex and pressing (Martin et al. 2012). The use of *structured* elicitation methods may increase the rigour with which decisions are made, aid the management of uncertainty, and mitigate prevalent and persistent biases that undermine judgement. Despite successful applications in, for example, threatened species assessments (McBride et al. 2012), prioritizing management strategies (e.g. Carwardine et al. 2019), risk assessments (Smith et al. 2015), and estimating population trends (Adams‐Hosking et al. 2016), most studies do not use a structured approach (Drescher & Edwards 2019). Expert-elicitation protocols require testing in a wider range of environmental decision making (Hemming et al. 2017), including in the harnessing of collective local ecological knowledge in groups without a strong numerical background or with different knowledge systems (Mantyka-Pringle et al. 2017). More research is also required to establish who should be consulted, the required number of experts, methods for combining judgments, techniques for training and feedback, and tools for independent verification of expert judgments (Martin et al. 2012). Evidence of how quickly expert judgments can be derailed by individual cognitive limitations highlights that experimental studies on human cognition in applied settings and with actual decision makers are a priority. Other fields, including education (e.g. Fay & Montague 2015) and medicine (e.g. Reilly et al. 2013), have integrated behavioural science into decision making and have devised and tested quality-control procedures and instructional materials. Methodological and conceptual advances could be made relatively quickly if practitioners and researchers adapted existing resources to the conservation context.

Crowdsourcing applications in conservation are advancing rapidly. For instance, the immensely popular Zooniverse (https://www.zooniverse.org/) hosts dozens of citizen science projects that combine the efforts of human volunteers completing research microtasks on anything from counting penguins to classifying galaxies. iNaturalist ([www.inaturalist.org](http://www.inaturalist.org)) supports over 9000 different projects and has gathered millions spatially explicit observations and species identifications submitted by the general public. These applications are forerunners of an increasingly participatory science model (Tinati et al. 2015).

Beyond collection and aggregation of data, crowdsourcing provides opportunity for innovation. For example, Climate CoLab, an online problem-solving platform, connects over 90,000 people to design and evaluate plans for addressing climate change. Projects may be combined into integrated plans and are finally evaluated by experts for cash prizes. It has so far generated proposals on new technologies, community projects, marketing strategies, businesses and policies, attracting a global stream of new and returning visitors who generate innovative and high-quality solutions (Duhaime et al. 2015). Climate CoLab has also provided rich content to evaluate the use of these socio-computational systems to solve other difficult problems (Introne et al. 2013).

Overall, crowdsourcing applications show great promise to scale up initiatives where resources and data are limited; they may also have additional benefits in education and raising awareness, supporting adaptive management, revealing low-frequency events, and improving scientific methods. Further improvements can be expected through integration with machine learning and AI-supported interaction.

However, to reach their full potential, environmental crowdsourcing initiatives must coordinate efforts, make data freely available, improve quality control, and explain how activities are linked to specific scientific objectives (Cox et al. 2015). Innovation-focused crowdsourcing tools may improve their impact by tapping into existing social networks and reinforcing a sense of community. To boost wide uptake and increase impact, contributors should receive personalised feedback and local, accessible, and directly relevant advice (Piccolo et al. 2018).

The main challenge across all forms of crowdsourcing is the lack of systematic evaluation. A better understanding of the mechanisms that support success could also inform how problems can best be structured for crowdsourcing. Existing research suggests that platform management, problem decomposition strategies, preferred characteristics of contributors, quality control, incentive setting, the management of participant motivations and clarity on intellectual property rights are all parameters that require further testing (Ghezzi et al. 2017). Evaluation of these elements should be guided by specific frameworks (Tredick et al. 2017) so that ultimately, standards for best practice could evolve into a refined, generalizable, and effective model for problem solving (Biggar 2010).

The empirical study of teamwork has largely been restricted to the realm of business studies and organizational psychology, with little, diffusion of this work into conservation. Organisations typically recruit employees based on individual technical skills and knowledge, possibly negating soft skills and group compositional features. This may come at the expense of collective performance, with some initial evidence from the conservation sector indicating potential impacts on judgement accuracy (e.g. Hemming et al. 2018) and decision quality (e.g. Buckingham 2010).

Metrics have already been developed that enable organizations to assess the potential for CI in teams (e.g. theory of mind [Bosco et al. 2016], group cognition [Woolley et al. 2010]). To have a real impact in terms of enabling capacity building for CI, these tools must be made widely available, validated against meaningful performance criteria, and tested specifically in environmental decision-making settings. Data from other fields suggest that to enable collective intelligence, organizations will have to consider restructuring communications, studying the formation of formal and informal networks and the roles team members play in each, strategically managing incentives, and promoting an organisational culture of psychological safety in which team members feel confident in expressing personal opinions and alternative views (Edmondson 1999). This a shift in our conception of what makes an effective conservation professional must be embedded in the curriculum for environmental and conservation courses and become part of organisational recruitment. We acknowledge that this will challenge institutional biases, bureaucratic processes, and accepted norms of power and decision making.

**Conclusions**

Conservation and environmental decision-making is complex and dynamic, providing a rich testing ground for existing (and new) CI tools. Some techniques (e.g. structured expert elicitation, crowd computing) may improve input into the decision-making process by enhancing data processing capacity and judgement accuracy. Other tools (e.g., crowd-based design and innovation contests) may add value by enabling more innovative or representative solutions. Recognition of the emergent properties of groups, rather than a focus on individual capacity could improve our capacity for problem solving. We challenge researchers and decision makers to draw upon lessons learned in other disciplines and to further develop, implement and evaluate the utility of CI tools for decision making.

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**Figure legends**

**Figure 1.** Three forms of collective intelligence and how they may assist in improving decision-support and decision-making processes in conservation.

